




Government Formations in the 





























The	 study	 discovers	 that	 both	 electoral	 volatility	 and	 fractionalisation	 have	 a	
substantial	 impact	 on	 the	 length	 of	 government	 formations.	 However,	 the	 study	 also	
discovers	that	despite	the	effect	of	 these	variables,	 it	cannot	be	conclusively	 justified	that	































Dutch	 parliamentary	 history	 followed.	 After	 225	 days	 of	 government	 formation,	 the	 new	
government	was	 installed,	 and	 ‘Rutte	 III’	 could	 commence	 its	 term	 (Parlement	&	Politiek,	
2018a).	The	trend	of	longer	lasting	government	formation	periods	has	been	on	the	rise	for	










(Mair,	 2008).	 Additionally,	 the	 number	 of	 parties	 that	 manage	 to	 be	 represented	 in	
parliament	 fluctuates,	 thus	 the	 fractionalisation	 of	 the	 parties	 alters	 greatly	 (Taylor	 &	
Herman,	1971).	For	example,	in	the	2017	election,	13	parties	obtained	seats	in	parliament,	
and	 therefore	 the	 number	 of	 seats	 per	 party	 decreased	 (Parlement	 &	 Politiek,	 2018a)	
(Parlement	 &	 Politiek,	 2018b).	 This	 phenomenon	 causes	 a	 more	 fractionalised	 political	
landscape.	Furthermore,	due	to	the	higher	number	of	parties,	the	political	spectrum	becomes	
more	 polarised	 because	 there	 needs	 to	 be	more	 space	 in	 between	 the	 parties,	 for	 party	
competition	to	be	present.	This	causes	the	emergence	of	more	extreme	parties	with	far-right	
and	far-left	ideologies.	(Schmitt,	2016)	
The	 following	 thesis	 examines	 if	 these	 changes	 in	 the	 variables	 correlate,	 and	 if	 they	
influence	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 government	 formation.	 From	 these	 questions,	 the	 research	










From	 the	 period	 after	 the	 second	 World	 War,	 the	 Netherlands	 has	 always	 been	
perceived	as	a	stable	democracy.	Especially	during	the	prime	time	of	the	pillarization,	which	
lasted	until	 the	 end	of	 the	 1960s,	 the	 governments	 that	were	 formed	were	 inclusive	 and	
“relatively	depoliticised”	(Andeweg,	2008,	p.	254).	The	pillarization	ensured	that	the	people	
voted	 according	 to	 their	 faith	 because	 the	 pillars	 were	 categorised	 by	 religion	 (“Roman	
Catholic,	 orthodox	 Calvinist	 or	 secular”	 (Bryant,	 1981,	 p.	 56)).	 Moreover,	 these	 pillars	
contained	not	only	parties,	but	also	schools,	unions,	and	media	outlets	(Bryant,	1981).	This	
strong	 structure	ensured	a	 relatively	high	predictability	of	 the	election	outcomes	because	
people	had	a	high	party	 loyalty.	When,	 in	 the	1960s,	 the	depillarisation	 commenced,	 this	
structure	 disappeared,	 and	 the	 party	 system	 changed	 rapidly	 with	 more	 consequences.	
Among	others,	 three	factors	have	 increased	over	the	following	decades,	as	a	result	of	 the	
depillarisation:	 the	number	of	seats	 that	change	after	an	election	 (electoral	volatility),	 the	





cases	because	of	 the	difference	 in	electoral	 system	and	party	 system,	which	makes	 it	 too	
complicated	to	control	for	these	alternative	explanations.	
Dependent	variable:	length	of	government	formation.		


















highly	 polarised	 (Golder,	 2006).	 The	 issue	with	 pre-electoral	 coalitions	 can	 be	 that	 voters	
chose	not	to	vote	for	their	desired	party	because	they	dislike	the	coalition	party.	Therefore,	
forming	 a	 pre-electoral	 coalition	 is	 a	 gamble	 for	 all	 the	 parties	 engaging	 in	 the	 coalition	
(Gschwend	&	Hooghe,	2008).		Post-election	coalitions	are	formed	when	it	is	clear	how	many	
seats	 every	 party	 has,	 and	 which	 parties	 have	 similar	 plans	 for	 the	 future.	 Post-election	
coalition	 government	 formations	 are	 often	 a	 long	 process,	 with	 different	 stages,	 it	 is	
important	that	the	process	as	a	whole	is	considered	in	the	Dependent	Variable	(DV).	
For	 the	 last	 century,	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 many	Western	 European	 countries,	
coalition	governments	have	been	the	norm.	In	a	coalition	government,	the	election	is	merely	




a	new	person	 is	 installed	by	parliament1,	 the	 “informateur”	 (Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018c)	
(Parlement	 &	 Politiek,	 2018e).	 This	 informateur	 then	 attempts	 to	 create	 the	most	 viable	
coalition	of	parties.	In	the	Netherlands,	it	is	common	that	the	biggest	party	is	part	of	the	first	
government	 formation	 attempt.	 In	 some	 cases,	 this	 attempt	 fails,	 after	 which	 often	 the	
informateur	 resigns,	 and	 a	 new	 one	 is	 appointed.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	 government	










then	 consults	 intended	 ministers	 and	 deputy	 ministers	 to	 form	 a	 cabinet.	 Lastly,	 the	
formateur	proposes	 the	new	government	 to	 the	king,	whom	 installs	 the	new	government	
(Parlement	 &	 Politiek,	 2018c).	 After	 this	 whole	 process,	 a	 coalition	 government	 can	
commence	its	governing	period.	The	coalition	government	can	have	two	different	forms,	a	
minority	government,	or	a	majority	government.	The	Netherlands	has	a	tradition	in	searching	
for	 a	 majority	 government;	 however,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 Parliament,	 but	 it	 is	 considered	
important	 that	 the	 parties	 that	 form	 the	 government	 also	 have	 a	majority	 in	 the	 Senate	
(Andeweg,	2008).	This	additional	difficulty	makes	the	Netherlands,	on	average,	one	of	 the	
most	time	costly	government	formations	in	Western	Europe	(Martin	&	Vanberg,	2003).	This	









the	 length	 of	 the	 government	 formation.	 The	 three	 variables	 are	 electoral	 volatility,	
fractionalisation	in	parliament,	and	polarisation	of	the	party	system.	
Independent	variable:	electoral	volatility.	
The	 first	 factor,	which	was	mentioned	 above,	 is	 investigated	 is	 electoral	 volatility.	
Electoral	 volatility	 is	 “the	 net	 change	 within	 the	 electoral	 party	 system	 resulting	 from	













according	 to	Mair,	 is	 the	party	 system	 itself.	 Because	of	 the	openness	of	 the	Dutch	party	










coalition	 governments,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 people	 vote	 for	 a	 party	 that	 has	 an	 expected	




strategically.	 There	 is	 a	 high	 chance	 that	 there	 are	multiple	 parties	 that	 are	 fairly	well	 in	
representing	a	person’s	ideology,	thus	people	can	easier	switch	between	parties,	if	they	think	
























































in	 which	 extreme	 parties	 could	 have	 a	 chance	 of	 governing.	 Deriving	 from	 the	














in	 the	 previous	 section;	 furthermore,	 the	 sources	 of	 the	 information	 will	 be	 presented.	
Deriving	 from	 this,	 the	 choices,	 considerations,	 limitations,	 and	 consequences	 will	 be	
discussed.	The	variables	that	will	be	employed	during	the	answering	of	the	research	question	












Vincenzo	 Emanuele4.	 In	 this	 dataset,	 Emanuele	 calculated	 the	 electoral	 volatility	 in	 three	
ways.	Firstly,	he	calculated	the	percentage	of	votes	that	changed	party	because	of	parties	






















from	the	website	parlgov.org.	 	𝑁 = 1 𝑃;:B;C4 	
	
Number of parties Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 5 ENP 
2 .5 .5    2 
2 .75 .25    1.60 
3 .25 .35 .40   2.90 
4 .10 .03 .32 .55  2.41 





right-wing.	 The	 website	 parlgov.org	 has	 provided	 most	 of	 the	 parties	 in	 Europe	 with	 an	
ideological	value.	By	calculating	a	weighted5	average	party	polarisation,	for	all	the	parties	that	
have	 gained	 seats	 in	 parliament	 after	 an	 election,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 compare	 the	 level	 of	
polarisation	election	after	election.		














has	 all	 the	 data	 complete.	 Furthermore,	 the	 election	 was	 vital	 because	 of	 the	 intended	
constitutional	 change	 (Parlement	&	 Politiek,	 2018g)6.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 compare	 the	





Prais	 uses	 the	 generalized	 least-squares	 method	 to	 estimate	 the	 parameters	 in	 a	 linear	
regression	 model	 in	 which	 the	 errors	 are	 serially	 correlated.	 Specifically,	 the	 errors	 are	
assumed	to	 follow	a	 first-order	autoregressive	process	 (Stata13,	2018).	A	 limitation	of	 the	
model	might	be	the	low	statistical	significance	of	the	correlation	coefficients,	due	to	the	small-
N.	 This	 result	will	 cause	 a	 smaller	 certainty	 that	 the	 relation	 that	 is	 observed	 because	 of	
random	 chance.	 This	 could	 be	 unfortunate,	 but	 will	 be	 supplemented	 by	 the	 following	
research	method.	







for	 the	electoral	volatility	have	a	big	difference,	as	well	as	 the	DV.	 In	 these	two	cases	 the	

















2006 92 20,20 5,5 2,33 
2010 127 23,60 6,7 2,48 
2012 54 15,85 5,7 2,35 











scatterplots,	 with	 a	 few	 outliers	 to	 the	 upper	 half	 of	 the	 scatterplots.	 From	 this	 can	 be	
concluded	that	the	regression	lines	are	likely	to	be	this	high	in	the	scatter	plots,	due	to	the	
high	value	of	the	outliers,	and	with	that	the	value	of	the	positive	residuals.	Furthermore,	the	
















between	 fractionalisation	 and	 polarisation	 is	 (r=.71).	 These	 results	 are	 confirming	
multicollinearity	among	the	IVs.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	variables	are	theoretically	looking	




When	moving	 to	 the	 regression	model	 (table	 3)	model	 1	 shows	 that	 the	 effect	 of	
electoral	 volatility	 has,	 as	 expected,	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 length	 of	 the	 government	
formation.	Changing	one	point	in	the	percentage	of	electoral	volatility	(the	variable	originally	
ranges	 from	4.8%	 to	31.3%)	 increases	 the	 length	of	government	 formation	 in	3	days.	The	
evidence	 is	 statistically	 significant	at	 the	10%	 level.	Model	2	 shows	 that,	 as	expected,	 the	












The	high	 correlation	between	 the	 two	variables	 (r=.64),	 together	with	 the	 low	number	of	
observations	in	the	model,	may	well	be	explaining	this	lack	of	statistical	signification.	In	model	
5,	 the	 level	 of	 electoral	 volatility	 and	 the	 degree	 polarisation	 are	 pooled	 together.	 As	
anticipated,	 the	 two	 coefficients	 show	 a	 positive	 relationship	with	 the	 DV.	 However,	 the	
variables	fail	to	be	statistically	significant.	It	is	probable	that	this	is	due	to	the	high	correlation	
between	the	two	variables	 (r=.79),	and	the	 low	number	of	observations.	For	model	6,	 the	
degree	of	fractionalisation	and	the	degree	of	polarisation	are	entered.	Both	of	the	variables	
are,	 as	 expected,	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 length	of	 government	 formation.	Nevertheless,	
both	variables	are	not	statistically	significant.	This	is	likely	due	to	the	high	correlation	between	
the	two	variables	(r=.71),	and	the	low	number	of	observations.	In	model	7,	all	three	IVs	are	
grouped	 together.	 All	 three	 IVs	 remain	 positively	 correlated	 with	 the	 length	 of	 the	
government	formation;	however,	all	variables	still	fall	short	of	statistical	signification.		
	
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
volatility 3.014+   1.913 1.828  1.533 
 (1.517)   (1.954) (2.521)  (2.590) 
fractionalisation  18.465+  10.946  10.928 9.559 
  (9.539)  (12.195)  (13.530) (13.898) 
polarisation   73.402+  37.424 42.730 16.383 
   (38.090)  (62.707) (53.932) (70.394) 
_cons 49.303* -3.606 -49.179 8.611 -5.665 -46.461 -10.289 
 (23.244) (49.677) (73.155) (50.998) (95.080) (73.774) (96.661) 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 














Senate,	with	 support	of	an	extra	party	 for	a	majority	 in	parliament	 (Parlement	&	Politiek,	
2018h).	In	2017	the	government	formation	took	225	days,	the	longest	government	formation	
since	the	second	World	War	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018a).	The	government	of	2017-present	
is	 categorised	as	 a	majority	 government	 in	both	Parliament	and	 the	Senate	 (Parlement	&	
Politiek,	2018h).	The	variable	that	varies	is	fractionalisation,	the	ENP.	In	2010	the	ENP	was	
6.7,	and	in	2017	at	8.1.		









D66,	 and	 GroenLinks;	 however,	 after	 100	 days	 GroenLinks	 ceased	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	
negotiations	 because	 of	 fundamental	 ideological	 differences.	 The	 negotiations	 continued	
with	the	VVD,	CDA,	D66,	and	the	CU	and	managed	to	complete	the	government	formation	






much	more	 difficult	 to	 find	 a	 formation	 that	 had	 a	majority	 in	 both	 the	 Senate	 and	 the	
Parliament	(NOS,	2017).	By	excluding	the	possibility	of	forming	a	coalition	with	the	PVV	before	









mechanism	 is	 that	when	 there	 are	more	 parties	 that	 need	 to	 partake	 in	 the	 government	
formation	 to	 form	 a	majority,	 the	 government	 formation	will	 take	 longer.	Moreover,	 the	
necessity	for	more	parties	in	a	government	is	likely	to	create	a	situation	where	parties	that	










Case	 2:	 Assessing	 the	 impact	 of	 electoral	 volatility	 with	 the	 2006	 and	 the	 2012	
elections.	
The	second	instance	investigates	the	elections	of	2006	and	2012,	where	the	impact	of	
the	variable	electoral	 volatility	on	 the	 length	of	 government	 formation	 is	 researched.	The	
other	 two	 IVs,	 fractionalisation	 and	 polarisation	 are	 kept	 constant.	 The	 degree	 of	































clear	 that	 the	 SP	 could	 not	 cooperate	 in	 a	 government,	 due	 to	 too	 different	 ideologies	
(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018m).	This	forced	the	CDA	and	PVDA	to	search	for	another	party,	to	
form	a	majority	government.	They	found	this	support	in	the	CU.	The	CU	had	doubled	in	size	
after	 the	 elections.	 This	 combination	 of	 parties	 proved	 to	 be	 fruitful	 as	 a	 government	
coalition,	and	after	a	total	of	89	days	the	new	government	was	 installed.	The	government	




















This	 paper	 aimed	 at	 finding	 the	 causal	 mechanism	 that	 determines	 the	 length	 of	
government	 formations	 in	 the	Netherlands.	 This	 has	 been	 attempted	 by	 looking	 at	 three	
variables	that	have	been	on	the	rise,	since	the	de-pillarization	of	the	end	of	the	1960s.	The	
three	 variables	 are	 electoral	 volatility,	 fractionalisation,	 and	 polarisation.	 By	 using	 a	






three	 variables	 are	 on	different	measurement	 scales,	which	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 compare	
them.	
In	 order	 to	 complement	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 quantitative	 analysis,	 a	 qualitative	
research	has	been	executed.	For	this	qualitative	research	a	MSSD	design	was	selected.	In	both	
of	the	instances,	the	DV	of	one	of	the	elections	was	almost	twice	as	big	as	the	other	election.	







government	 formation.	 The	 first	 instance,	 researching	 the	 impact	 fractionalisation	 on	 the	
length	of	government	formation,	showed	that	with	a	higher	number	of	effective	parties	 it	
becomes	more	challenging	to	find	enough	parties	to	form	a	coalition.	However,	this	was	not	




can	 still	 be	 a	 disrupting	 feature	 for	 the	 government	 formations.	 In	 the	 second	 instance,	









when	 there	 is	 a	 less	 stable	 parliament,	 with	many	 parties	 and	many	 new	members,	 the	
government	formation	does	take	substantially	longer.	It	is	therefore	possible	to	conclude	that	
for	 all	 three	 factors,	 when	 increasing,	 do	 contribute	 to	 a	 longer	 government	 formation.	
Nevertheless,	 this	conclusion	cannot	completely	 justify	 that	the	alteration	 in	the	 length	of	
government	formation	is	solely	due	to	these	three	factors,	other	factors	can	play	part	in	the	
events	and	creation	of	the	government.		
This	 thesis	 has	 researched	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 length	 of	 government	
formation	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 the	 factors	 electoral	 volatility,	 fractionalisation,	 and	
polarisation.	 As	 research	 method	 for	 the	 quantitative	 part,	 a	 time	 series	 regression	 was	
chosen	to	investigate	the	correlations	between	the	DV	and	the	IVs.	A	limitation	of	this	time	
series	 design,	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a	 low	 external	 validity	 because	 the	 correlations	 that	 are	








as	 well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 three	 IVs	 were	 highly	 correlated,	 which	 made	 it	 difficult	 to	
determine	the	partial	effect	of	the	IVs.		
Despite	 the	 evidence	 found,	 the	 present	 research	 may	 raise	 some	 concerns	 that	
further	research	should	address.	For	example,	further	research	could	go	more	in	depth	in	the	
exclusion	of	coalition	possibilities,	prior	to	the	elections.	By	investigating	the	‘actual’	ENP	that	
are	 eligible	 for	 coalition	 government	 formation,	 it	 can	 be	 researched	 if	 alteration	 to	 the	
electoral,	or	parliamentary	system,	should	be	made.	From	this	research	recommendations	
can	be	made	to	more	actively	make	pre-election	coalitions.	As	Golder	has	discovered,	when	
party	 systems	 become	more	 polarised,	 pre-election	 coalitions	 occur	 more	 often	 (Golder,	
2006).	Another	possibility	that	could	be	researched,	is	whether	minority	governments	are	as	
effective	 as	 majority	 governments	 because	 if	 that	 is	 the	 case,	 the	 coalition	 government	
formation	 can	 take	more	 formations	 after	 an	 election.	 Lastly,	 the	 same	 research	 can	 be	
conducted	 on	 a	 different	 country,	 with	 a	 different	 institutional	 design,	 but	 without	























































































































Christen Democratisch Appel      CDA 
ChristenUnie        CU 
Dependent Variable       DV 
Democraten ’66       D66 
Effective Number of Parties      ENP 
European Union       EU 
Independent Variable       IV 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD 
Partij van de Arbeid       PVDA 
Partij voor de Dieren       PvdD 
Partij voor de Vrijheid      PVV 
VoorNederland       VNL 




Obs=21	 Volatility	 Fractionalisation	 Polarisation	
Volatility	 1.0000	 	 	
Fractionalisation	 0.6402	 1.0000	 	













1948	 31	 6,55	 4,7	 1,76	
1952	 69	 6,30	 4,7	 1,69	
1956	 25	 4,80	 4,1	 1,62	
1959	 68	 6,45	 4,1	 1,58	
1963	 70	 5,80	 4,5	 1,65	
1967	 49	 12,00	 5,7	 1,67	
1971	 40	 13,50	 6,4	 1,74	
1972	 163	 11,80	 6,4	 1,91	
1977	 208	 13,00	 3,7	 1,70	
1981	 108	 8,90	 4,3	 1,78	
1982	 57	 8,60	 4,0	 1,88	
1986	 54	 11,05	 3,5	 1,60	
1989	 62	 5,45	 3,8	 1,64	
1994	 111	 22,20	 5,4	 1,84	
1998	 89	 16,90	 4,8	 1,97	
2002	 68	 31,30	 5,8	 2,23	
2003	 123	 16,55	 4,7	 2,00	
2006	 92	 20,20	 5,5	 2,33	
2010	 127	 23,60	 6,7	 2,48	
2012	 54	 15,85	 5,7	 2,35	
2017	 225	 23,25	 8,1	 2,45	
Table	5	Data	for	the	quantitative	research.	
	
	
	
	
	
